The Mediterranean Basin has long been afflicted with at least two important cleavages: the rich/poor or North/South division on the one hand, and alleged civilizational tensions between Islam and the West, brandished even more forcefully after the events of 9/11. Both classical security issues (the drive toward non-conventional weapons in the Middle East, terrorism, oil and natural gas dependencies) and "new" security issues (migration, drugs, human rights violations, environmental degradation) bear on EU concerns with the political fate of the Mediterranean basin (Joffe, 1998) . EU partners perceive economic stagnation, absence of democracy, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism to be the sources of security threats to Europe emanating from the southern Mediterranean states. Arab partners, on the other hand, insist on the distinction between terrorism and Islam, are divided internally and externally over the merits of economic integration into the global economy and over democratic reforms.
Without a single democratic regime in place, most resist changes in their political and social structures, although there is significant variation among them in their readiness to liberalize. 1 Furthermore, whereas Europe is said to converge on democratic and market-oriented interests and identities, the southern Mediterranean states lack such coherence of purpose and interests.
Finally, despite continuous internal disagreements along the way, the EU has developed the deepest and most comprehensive form of regional institutionalized multilateral cooperation while such efforts have largely failed among southern Mediterranean states, even within the Arab world itself, as evidenced by the Arab League. Most of these differences must be overcome for stable and long-term regional cooperation between the EU and the southern Mediterranean states to emerge. This chapter addresses the sources and effects of these cleavages in institutions, identities, and interests, and their consequences for the development of a meaningful and stable Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In section I we begin by analyzing the broad theoretical foundations in institutional theory that underlie the triple logic of the Barcelona process. Section II elaborates the specific arguments on which each pillar of the triple logic rests. Next, we examine the triple logic at work, through the prism of a case study: Turkey. Our purpose is not to suggest that Turkey provides a prototype of the southern Mediterranean states; indeed, it might be argued that it differs quite significantly from all others in its progress toward markets, democracy, and multilateralism (the latter on account of its NATO membership and special relationship with the EU). Precisely because of this progress, Turkey might be expected to provide an "easy case" for EU-southern Mediterranean states cooperation. Yet, the fact that important dilemmas remain even in this case makes it an especially critical and interesting category for exploring the dilemmas of the triple logic. 3 Section IV discusses whether and how the Barcelona Initiative has operated as a source of socialization into the triple logic and the possible effects of such socialization on the continuity of the Initiative. We end with a discussion of dilemmas and hurdles embedded in the triple logic of the Barcelona process.
I. Theoretical Underpinnings of the EMP
Institutional theory has been marshaled to explain cooperation among states. Some institutionalist perspectives treat institutions as dependent variables that emerge and change as a result of acts, expectations, power, and preferences of agents. Others treat institutions as independent variables that have constraining and, in some cases, constitutive effects on state perceptions and behavior. Neorealism, a brand of rational choice, emphasizes the power of states as agents and their purposeful decisions in explaining institutional outcomes. Neoliberal institutionalism sees states as agents designing institutions to advance their joint interests. 3 On the methodological advantages of this kind of analysis, see Eckstein (1975) .
According to these models, institutions are endogenous whereas individual preferences are exogenous, that is, institutions are explained on the basis of preferences that are defined outside of the institutional context (Keohane, 1989; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999) . Thus, institutions emerge and survive because they serve to maximize those exogenously determined interests and preferences of their members, especially those founding members who designed the institution. Neorealism focuses on the extent to which powerful states dominate institutions whereas latecomers or less powerful members have less control over institutional decisions and outcomes, hence benefiting least from their creation (Sened, 1991; Gruber, 2000) . Neoliberal institutionalists, instead, argue that the 'shadow of the future'--the possibility to attain gains in the future--provides a strong incentive for all states to cooperate and create institutions that benefit all parties.
Rational choice institutionalism is highly relevant in explaining the motivations of EMP partners. First of all, the preferences of member states seem to be determined largely outside the context of EMP. EU partners have their own national, subnational, and regional goals and concerns. Similarly, the southern Mediterranean states' expectations from the Barcelona Initiative differ not only from their EU partners but also from each other. Seen in this light, the Initiative is the product of exogenously defined preferences of agents (states, politicians, or different domestic groups). EU governments and publics consider political and economic instability in the southern Mediterranean states /Middle East region as the main security threat to the EU leading them to promote a more secure, peaceful, and stable foundation for democracy and economic reform in that region. In a wide-ranging survey on the security aspects of European integration in 1991, Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, identified the need for Europe's 'Southern flank' (the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Middle East) to develop economically as a pre-requisite for achieving peace and stability in the region. 4 In February 1995, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary General, launched a new NATO initiative for the Mediterranean, identifying Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to European security comparable to communism. Many have also identified poor economic performance, control of key energy supplies, demographic change and population movements, Islamic fundamentalism and cultural incompatibilities, terrorism, drugs trafficking, depletion of natural resources, and conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation as sources of instability affecting EU security. Yet others, reflecting more neorealist tendencies, see the need for the EU, as a rational actor, to commit to EU-Mediterranean cooperation and Middle East stabilization if it is to emerge as a genuine world power. As the former Director General for North-South Relations of the European Commission Juan Prat (1997) suggests, "the US is interested in the region because it is a global power. The region is important for the EU because it is our geopolitical region, it is our business to talk about the business of the countries of this region." Since the EMP is seen as an extension of the EU political and economic influence in the region, there is also a perceived imbalance among partners in their decision-making power.
Neorealists take for granted the zero-sum quality of an institution whereas neoliberal institutionalists tend to focus on absolute gains for all. In the latter's view, southern Mediterranean states choose to participate in the Initiative because they expect economic growth and related benefits.
Central to neoliberal institutionalism is the notion of 'transaction costs'. "The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consists of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements" (North, 1990, p.27) . Thus, institutions are desirable, despite the constraints they impose on nation states, because they reduce transaction costs associated with rule making, negotiating, implementing/enforcing, information gathering and conflict resolution. In the initial stages of the Initiative, some (domestic) transitional costs for southern Mediterranean states were expected to be higher than the adjustment costs for EU members.
'Trade liberalization with the EU will affect protected industries in the region, which will need to adjust to the increasing competition by reducing labor costs through cutting employees (Nsouli, et al. 1996) . Increased unemployment in the short term is regarded as a main challenge as well.
In the longer term, however, the Initiative is considered to facilitate future growth and stability.
For EU partners, financial contributions were considered a temporary burden that would, in the long term, reduce transaction costs with the southern Mediterranean states. For instance, the costs of gathering information on security issues of great concern to the EU--weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug-trafficking, and organized crime--would decrease as a result of increased institutional cooperation with southern Mediterranean states.
Constructivist institutionalism conceptualizes institutions as a collection of norms, rules
and routines, rather than a formal structure. 5 In contrast to rational choice theories, institutions cannot simply change the preferences of actors, but can also shape their identity (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Klotz and Lynch, 2004) . Constructivism focuses on the central role of ideology, rules, and norms that institutions diffuse to constitute agents. Against a "logic of instrumentality" or "logic of consequences" of rational choice institutionalism, it posits a "logic of appropriateness", arguing that individuals' actions are guided by social expectations rather than utility maximization calculations (March and Olsen, 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) . Rules, routines, and procedures can be imposed or enforced by a political authority, or they can be part of a code of appropriate behavior that is internalized through socialization. Institutional routines are followed even when there is no obvious self-interest involved. The internalization of shared norms through socialization is instrumental in this understanding of institutions, as is learning and adaptation to the social environment. According to this framework, agents are socialized into institutional routines drawing greater attention to cognitive processes, schemas, scripts, social categories and classifications. Constructivism emphasizes the relation between social structure and inter-subjective understandings (collective meaning-making), which is the byproduct of cognitive processes, interpretation of norms, dominant ideology, and dominant discourse. Institutional practices reinforce individuals' thinking and organize knowledge. In return, internalized norms, knowledge and dominant discourse reproduce the institutions.
Institutions are capable of change; yet they also carry elements of stability (Klotz and Lynch, 2004) . One of the ways in which institutions reproduce themselves is by engaging individuals in a dialogue of specialized (dominant) language that transforms individuals' thinking patterns. The socialization process is critical in producing cooperative behavior. States (especially newcomers) are socialized into international institutions through two microprocesses: persuasion and social influence (Johnston, 2001) . We discuss the effects of socialization on the future of EMP below.
Constructivism draws our attention to the possible drawbacks of the absence of shared norms and common culture among Euro-Med partners. At the same time, the framework can be useful for exploring how to overcome cultural and ideological differences between EU and southern Mediterranean states, and amongst them. The logic of appropriateness seems less salient in the EMP's rather brief history than the logic of consequences. However, in tandem with the material objectives that may accrue over time, the viability of the Initiative will require proper attention to socialization and transformative efforts toward common purpose.
The fourth and final approach to the origin and functioning of institutions is more sensitive to domestic politics and disaggregates among groups that are more likely to benefit from the institution than others (Moravcsik 1998 , Solingen 2004 . Accordingly, the assumption that all economic sectors in each southern Mediterranean state will respond equally to the opportunities and constraints of market reform, or that all societal forces approach the process of democratization with the same strategies and objectives in mind, seems misleading. The same is, of course, the case for EU members, whose specific sectoral interests shape their view of what should be done or avoided in the context of the EMP (agriculture is a good example).
The next section applies a perspective rooted in domestic responses to explain the behavior of both EU and Southern Mediterranean actors vis-à-vis the EMP.
Beyond these conceptual approaches to international institutions in international relations, historical institutionalism as a brand of institutionalist theory in the social sciences provides an important perspective for understanding crucial founding moments of institutional formation that shape future paths. Institutions evolve in response to changing environmental conditions in ways constrained by past trajectories (Thelen, 1999 p.387) . This framework provides two very useful concepts for the analysis of institutional persistence and change. The first is "path dependency", the idea that once a policy choice has been made it will tend to persist throughout the institution's development. However, path dependency (being "locked into" a given path) does not preclude institutions from changing over time and takes account of evolutionary processes, although the initial path frames the range of possibilities for institutional change. A second important concept in historical institutionalism is "critical junctures" or "punctuated equilibrium," the idea that equilibrium (stability) is not permanent and that there will be bursts of institutional change followed by long periods of stasis (Peters, 2001, p.68 ) Various institutional configurations emerge at different times and out of different historical contexts, sustained by broader political and social issues. Similarly, institutional change cannot be analyzed in isolation from the political and social setting in which it is embedded (Thelen, p.16) Historical institutionalism draws our attention to the economic, social and political context within which the EMP emerged in the mid-1990s. The post-Cold War era created greater convergence toward an international community committed to political stability, increased democratic participation, economic development, integration in the global economy, and improvements in human rights. At the same time, the 1990s found most southern Mediterranean states rather lagging in economic reform, democratic transformation, and regional and international cooperation, not merely relative to the EU but relatively to other industrializing regions as well. The initial conditions for embarking on the institutional path underlying the EuroMed Initiative foreshadowed considerable difficulties in the implementation of the triple logic. At the same time, the launching of the EMP provided a critical juncture for a much hoped transformative process. By locking in certain commitments with the EU, southern Mediterranean states' leaders could justify domestic reforms as part of a regional cooperative enterprise (Nsouli, et al. 1996) . The expectation was that greater political participation and economic stability would encourage domestic and foreign investment, chartering a new path-dependency that would make it hard to reverse it once it got under way.
These different approaches, relying on alternative emphases on power, interests, norms, and evolutionary processes provide complementary windows into the broad institutional contours of the EMP. We now turn to more specific arguments sustaining the "triple logic."
II. The Three Pillars of the EMP
As argued, the Barcelona process brings to relief three institutional pillars on which a peaceful Mediterranean region would presumably rest: economic reform, democracy and regional multilateralism. These pillars reflect three interrelated logics rooted in more general perspectives on the sources of regional conflict and cooperation. and to encourage structural reform and privatization. MEDA II (1999) expected the "structural adjustment facility" financed under MEDA I to target more specifically the reforms necessary for free trade with the EU on the one hand, and to streamline EU decision making on the other. 7
The underlying objective was to help adapt southern Mediterranean states to an increasingly freer and globalized economy in the belief that such transformation would also help resolve the many socio-political problems in the region.
By the early 1990s the Middle East had become the least self-sufficient area in the world in food, with among the highest rates of infant mortality and illiteracy (particularly female), high levels of unemployment and underemployment rates, enormous income disparities, high inflation, overvalued real exchange rates, and uncompetitive goods. The MEDA Regulation was adopted in 1996 and the beneficiaries are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Up to 1998 the MEDA Programme has committed 2,325 billion euro and disbursed 600 million euro for economic reform, social cohesion and regional cooperation. 8 On the legacy of statism in the region, see Richards and Waterbury (1990:219-99) , Owen (1992:139-65) , Bill and Springborg (1990:20) , UNDP (1994:209) , Heydemann (1993) . 9 UNDP HDR 1994-1998. Both qualitative and quantitative studies found internationalizing ruling coalitions to be more prone to intensify their country's trade openness (imports plus exports/GDP) and expand exports, to attract foreign investments and curb wasteful military-industrial complexes, to shun weapons of mass destruction, defer to international economic and security regimes, and strive for regional cooperative orders that reinforce those objectives. Instead, backlash ruling coalitions were found to restrict and reduce trade openness, exports, and foreign investment, while building expansive military-industrial complexes and weapons of mass destruction, challenging international security and economic regimes, and exacerbating civic, religious, and ethnic-nationalist differentiation within their region through an emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty, and self-reliance. Coherent coalitional grand strategies are hard to find in the real world but the links between a commitment to internationalization and regional cooperation and stability are evident (the latter two are extremely important for the kind of macroeconomic and investment policies pursued by internationalizing coalitions).
Different coalitional combinations in different regions create regional orders, "identities,"
and shared expectations about conflict and cooperation and, conversely, are affected by them. and foreign investment, promoted tourism, and reduced maximum tariff rates from 220 percent to 43 percent in the early 1990s (Rodrik, 1994:62) . Jordan implemented liberalizing reforms to improve foreign investment throughout the 1990s and embraced FTAs with the EU and the US.
Under Sadat's infitah (`opening up') initiative in the mid-1970s Egypt began its slow process of liberalizing economic sectors, although it has often provided a paradigm for little structural adjustment, regulatory reform, privatization, or trade liberalization (Cassandra, 1995) .
Unsurprisingly from the perspective of the coalitional argument outlined above, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia were also strong supporters of the Oslo and multilateral peace processes, which were regarded as a sine qua non for creating stable regional conditions propitious for economic development. The connections are made clear in the analysis of Riad Al Khouri (1994:110, 111, and (Hinnebusch,1995:74) . 14 The entrenched, oversized, Ba'ath-run state has largely resisted economic liberalization despite some incipient steps in the 1980s that essentially "carefully On the affinity between nationalism and Islamist fundamentalism, see also Rouleau (1993) . 13 On populism as a common characteristic of both Arab nationalists and Islamist radicals, see Leca (1994:79) 14 On support among Syrian private entrepreneurs for a peace settlement with Israel, see Lawson (1994:63) . On regional conflict and (domestic) military gains throughout the Arab world, see Waterbury (1994) . 15 Heydemann (1992:94) . See also Hinnebusch (1993); Rabinovich (1993), and Lawson (1994) .
democratization and greater international openness although reformists have, thus far, been overwhelmed by resistance from the conservative clerics and their political allies in the judiciary, military, and state enterprises. Unlike Southeast Asia, there is no critical mass of internationalizers within this arch, let alone in its periphery. On the whole, economic reform has proceeded at a much slower pace in the Middle East than virtually everywhere else (including some areas in Africa) and political resistance to economic openness remains quite strong in most cases.
b) The Logic of Democracy
The Barcelona process also aimed at encouraging "good governance," namely democracy and human rights, and advanced the development of confidence-building measures to enhance regional security. In the European experience, stable and mature democracies are considered to be better suited to deal with ethnic and religious fragmentation than nondemocracies. Differences can be channeled through established political parties and legal institutions able to adjudicate along more or less neutral (civic) lines. 16 In this view, only democracy can be expected to guarantee human rights and personal freedoms. "Good governance" cannot emanate from regimes that are not accountable. Furthermore, the 1990s diffused the idea (developed by Kant) that democracies tend to safeguard peace in their interactions with each other. Despite contradictory logics of democratization in the Middle East (see below), the commitment of European publics to these principles makes it hard to envisage a EU Mediterranean policy that does not rely on these norms. From the EU perspective, democracy appears a win-win: it is expected to deliver human rights to the southern Mediterranean states and peaceful interactions between the Mediterranean north and south.
Yet, the progression toward democracy in the southern Mediterranean states has been rather slow in contrast to democratization in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1990s there was some movement towards selected democratic procedures and political liberalization characterized by incipient, tentative and piecemeal steps, and marked by significant reversals (Solingen 2003a) . Morocco, a pioneer in its tolerance for freedom of the press and association with a relatively strong (in regional terms) civil society, has seen some barriers placed on the monarchy. By the late 1990s there was a government led by the traditional opposition (although appointed by late King Hassan) and further improvements were detected with the inception of King Mohammed to the throne in 1999. Jordan has experienced competitive parliamentary elections since 1989 and a lively press debate over domestic and foreign policy. Liberalization has both suffered some setbacks after 9/11 but also nudged some rulers in a liberalizing--albeit tentative--direction, particularly in some of the Gulf states. Egypt has restricted political participation through electoral laws and procedures that favor the ruling National Democratic Party (Harik, 1994; Korany, Brynen, and Noble, 1998) To the extent that some democratization-from-above has taken place throughout the region--launched by state elites with varying degrees of support from powerful societal actors--these have been efforts at coopting influential elites while placing strict controls on the expansion of political rights. These barriers to democratization make initiatives in the third area of the Barcelona Process--society and culture--harder to sustain. These initiatives include the development of networks of human rights organizations and economic and defense institutes (EuroMeSCo is a network of strategic studies institutes, and FEMISE is a network of economic Institutes). The promotion of private organizations and NGOs through the EMP is expected to reinforce democratization, economic reform, and multilateral cooperation but the record has, thus far, fallen short of expectations.
c) The Logic of Regional Multilateral Institutions
The merits of regional multilateral institutions in the eyes of EU officials and publics are quite clear: "if it worked in Europe, why not everywhere?" The EU experience has had a profound influence in international relations regarding the role of regional institutions in cooperation. However, it is important to recognize that cooperation can come about even where there is either little integration or institutions, whereas conflict is possible in the presence of both. 17 This is supported by findings from coalitional analysis and regional conflict and cooperation in other regions, beyond the EU (Solingen 1998 the EMP initiatives might be considered complementary to further regional integration, and perhaps a catalytic factor in bringing integration about.
III. Turkey: The EU, the EMP, and the triple logic in action
Turkey is one of the few countries regarded as closest to the EU's internationalizing expectations. However, a strong commitment to the EMP is fused with many dilemmas for Turkey, which has been a rather reluctant partner to the EMP process at the outset. On the one hand, Turkish governments have always strongly supported regional organizations and initiatives aimed at creating a more peaceful and stable Mediterranean basin, given Turkish concerns with its territorial integrity and national interests. On the other hand, Turkey regards the EMP as a pale initiative relative to its own more ambitious expectations from EU membership (Yilmaz, 2002) . Turkish leaders frequently stress that the EMP can never be an alternative to the kind of relationship Turkey wants with the EU. They also emphasize more realistic and modest goals than those proclaimed in the EMP process. Summing up thus far, Turkey's economic reforms are considered to be the successful result of policies instituted by successive ruling coalitions committed to internationalization. Its current Islamic leadership has continued to implement this strategy, a behavior that can be traced to a combination of path dependency, the creation of domestic constituencies vested in this trajectory, and the socialization of other Turkish constituencies into EU norms. These advances notwithstanding, significant problems remain, including regional disparities in HDI. In 1975, one third of Turkey's eastern and southern provinces were in the low HDI category whereas its western provinces were at the medium-level category. In 1999, all eastern and southern provinces--except one--reached the medium category and its western provinces climbed up to the high HDI level (ibid). The eradication of this inequality will be one of the main challenges in the years to come. The EU provided funds and loans to support education projects, including EUR 182 million allocated to six projects in the most disadvantaged Turkey rejected them on the grounds that no conditionality should be attached to MEDA funds (Tayfur, 2001) . Finally, especially before the Helsinki and Copenhagen summits, Turkey hoped its status within the EMP would derive from its association and CU with the EU, placing it on the European side of the negotiations. Instead, Turkey was confined to the non-EU category. Since
Helsinki the Turkish vision of the EMP as an economic project has changed considerably and it now considers itself closer to the EU, taking the EMP initiative more seriously.
b) Democracy and Human Rights
Turkey has had a long and promising experience with democracy in comparison to other Muslim countries in the region. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic at the end of World War I, Turkey adopted Western values, including Western political and legal systems, under Kemal Ataturk. Although Turkey's initial experience with democracy was an elite driven, "revolution from above" experience, democratic values became internalized both at the popular and regime level. There were three instances when parliamentary democracy was suspended as a result of military coups, but in each case the brief military takeover was followed by democratic elections. This is no perfect democracy, however, particularly regarding the treatment of minority populations.
In where Turkey has more decision-making power than in any other venues (Yilmaz, 2002) .
Turkey also prefers a security dialogue through the OSCE, of which Turkey has been a full member since its inception, rather than through the EU, where Turkish power is limited as an associate member. given the enormous gaps among other southern Mediterranean states, Turkey is perhaps uniquely positioned to help bridge them. This brings us to a discussion of the concrete mechanisms through which socialization works to change values and interests.
IV. The Barcelona Process as an Instrument of Socialization
Perhaps the main challenge to the EMP is the absence of a strong commitment to the process on both sides, and a lack of identification on the part of the southern Mediterranean states with many of the norms, rules, interests, and worldviews embedded in the triple logic.
Southern Mediterranean states have achieved little economic cooperation amongst themselves and lag significantly in political and economic reform, let alone in developing collective security schemes. Efforts to develop a Euro-Mediterranean collective identity, build confidence, and consolidate trust can be helped by improving the ability to arrive at common understandings. To that effect, a proper understanding of mechanisms of socialization in multilateral institutions is required. The work of Johnston (2001) provides a particularly useful foundation in that regard.
Johnston recognizes material rewards and punishments as key sources of cooperation leading states to join some international organizations and to shun activities punished by the international community. However, rational calculations are, in his view, insufficient to explain states' actions or institutional outcomes, which not always reflect rational states nor capture differences in the quality of participation and in the level of commitment states make to different international institutions. The degree and quality of cooperation can best be understood through the process and degree of socialization that takes place among partners. Communication, interaction, and influence within an institutional context can generate common understandings that go beyond material gains and losses.
Socialization is the process by which the newcomer internalizes norms and values of a group and is incorporated into organized patterns of interaction (Stryker and Statham, 1985) .
The literature on socialization suggests that in the absence of material incentives, identification with or affective attachment to a valued group provides the motivation to act in accordance with the group norms. Identification with the group leads the newcomer to perceive the authority (the sponsor of the norms) as legitimate, to mimic the valued group's behavior, and to perceive defecting from the group norms as costly to one's self-esteem (Axelrod, 1997) . One of the effective microprocesses of socialization involves the cognitive process of persuasion and aims at changing opinions and attitudes. The process of successful persuasion can lead to the creation of a common knowledge and homogenization of interests among actors by eliminating differences between actors' initial perceptions and cognitions (Johnston, 2001:234) . A key element in successful persuasion is the persuadee's perceived knowledge and trustworthiness of the persuader. Shared ideology, identity, and other cultural cues affect the ways in which the persuadee determines the trustworthiness of the persuader (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Johnston, 2001:236) . Social influence through dominant discourse is another effective mechanism of socialization that distributes social rewards and punishments among actors.
Language structures institutional behaviors and shapes identity formation processes by creating a unique discourse shared by all members of a community (Klotz and Lynch, 2004 It is quite likely that negotiations within the EMP reflect, in a general sense, the EU's internal order, layers of authority, and institutional mechanisms, more than a mutually negotiated structure (Smith, 2000) . It is possible that some amount of socialization into the triple logic has taken place, and it is also possible that some progress in socialization has not improved cooperative practices .19 It may also be the case that the EMP process has not directed enough attention to the social interaction environment or that initial values and preferences were so far apart that any efforts at socialization are extremely difficult if not doomed. Even a 18 A Jordanian diplomat expressed the lack of a common position on the part of Southern Mediterranean partners quite succinctly when he said: "Barcelona will be the European Union facing 12 countries, each with its own agenda and not listening to the others" (Whiteman, 2001) . 19 Many have argued, for instance, that the EU has not been as committed to socialization into democratic institutions. Southern Mediterranean states constituencies can find numerous allies in their effort to socialize EU members into the recognition that the EU's agricultural policies may well constitute the greatest threat to Mediterranean security.
Democracy, economic reform, and multilateral cooperation do not obtain automatically, linearly, or inevitably, as was expected at the inception of the post Cold-War order. They can only result from concerted activities of political leaders, in government and in opposition, and of the societal forces that back them up. Socialization into the value of democratic institutions is intrinsic to this process. Leaders of southern Mediterranean states confront a dilemma: they either phase this multifaceted process of change in or run the risk of being themselves phased out by it. Which will take place is hard to foresee. The first option has a second-order dilemma folded unto it: leaders seem deadlocked between "democratic efficiency" arguments (democratization can facilitate economic reform and help build new political coalitions to overcome opponents of economic reform) and "authoritarian advantage" models, illustrated by China and the East Asian tigers (Pool,1993; Harik, 1994; Norton, 1995) . Predictions about which model might prevail are hindered by what Kuran (1991) labelled "the predictability of unpredictability" or the imperfect observability of real private preferences under authoritarian rule, a phenomenon that foiled predictions of Eastern European democratization and economic reform as well.
A related dilemma for southern Mediterranean states' leaders (and some secular oppositional constituencies as well) is the perceived "theocracy trap," fueled by the fear--evident in the Algerian case--that democratization may not lead to democracy but to Islamic theocracies. This fear may be exaggerated, considering that political inclusion of Islamist groups (where practiced, as in Jordan) appears to have led to diminishing political returns for Islamist movements, in the form of stable--and at times even declining--electoral gains. Iran, although in the "outer ring," may also constitute a promising path to more democratic institutions, although the latter are still forcefully resisted by powerful backlash forces among clerics, military, and state enterprises. The challenge to avoid the Algerian debacle remains: strong institutional arrangements must be designed to protect the integrity of the democratic system so that even a small plurality of votes cannot undermine democratic continuity. The EMP may have thus far underplayed socialization into Western models of church-state separation, for obvious reasons.
In any event, dialogue and persuasion within southern Mediterranean societies seem far more important in bringing about an accommodation that also protects individual (prominently gender)
rights. This "battle for the minds" is more compelling after 9/11 than anytime before.
As if the EMP did not face enough difficulties since its inception, the war with Iraq and the presence of US forces in the heart of the Arab world add new complexities and uncertainties. It is far too early to tell what will be the implications for Iraq of the operation of the "triple logic,", let alone their second and third order effects within the region. In particular, the effects of the rift between the US and some European leaders during the war have continued to undermine the development of a common purpose on the reconstruction of Iraq. This will require enhanced efforts within EMP structures to strengthen mechanisms likely to enhance the prospects of successful economic, political, and social reform in Iraq.
Finally, the EU has played a central role in the so-called "quartet" process to help nudge the Israel/Palestine conflict towards some accommodation. On the one hand, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is an important variable--although clearly not the only barrier--to advancing the Barcelona process. On the other hand, all the dilemmas involving coalitions and the "triple logic" identified above cast their shadow on this conflict, turning it into a microcosm of the broader themes raised in this chapter. As of late 2003, whether or not this microcosm can be nested in the "triple logic" that underlies the macro Mediterranean framework remains uncertain.
The viability of the EMP may partially hang on this balance.
